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PARENT IN LIFE, STRANGER AT LAW:
ADDRESSING THE INEQUALITY AND
INCONSISTENCY OF PARENTAGE RIGHTS
OF SAME-SEX PARENTS
PAUL COOGAN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A married heterosexual couple decides that it is time to start
a family. Unfortunately, the couple is unable to conceive naturally
so they decide to embark on the process of in vitro fertilization
(“IVF”).1
Together, they find a willing sperm donor whom they know
and trust. Together, the couple prepares physically, emotionally,
and financially to bring a child into their lives. Despite the fact
that their child is genetically linked to only the mother,2 they are
* Paul Coogan is a 2013 graduate of The John Marshall Law School. He would
first like to thank his parents for their unending support, guidance, and
encouragement. He would also like to thank Lily Strumwasser, Shane Devins,
Brian Roth, and all the candidates who helped prepare this Comment for
publication.
1. Michael Hopkins, What Is Sauce for the Gander Is Sauce for the Goose:
Enforcing Child Support on Former Same-Sex Partners Who Create a Child
through Artificial Insemination, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 219, 221 (2006).
IVF is a process whereby one or more ova are removed from the woman and
fertilized by sperm outside the woman’s body. Id. Once the egg is fertilized, it
is placed in the woman’s uterine cavity. Id.
This Comment primarily refers to IVF, but the analysis and discussion
apply to other methods of insemination that occur without sexual intercourse.
Artificial insemination, for example, is a process similar to IVF, but differs in
that sperm is deposited into a woman’s uterus once she has ovulated. Harvey
L. Fiser & Paula K. Garrett, It Takes Three, Baby: The Lack of Standard,
Legal Definitions of “Best Interest of the Child” and the Right to Contract for
Lesbian Potential Parents, 15 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 1, 3 n.3 (2008).
2. Pregnancy through IVF is often achieved using the mother’s egg and
the sperm of a sperm donor. Infertility Treatments – Sperm Donation,
FACTOR.COM,
FERTILITY
http://www.fertilityfactor.com/infertility_medical_options_sperm_donor.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2013). Heterosexual couples often use this procedure
when the man is sterile or the couple wishes to prevent passing on a genetic
disease or disorder. Id. Single women and lesbian couples also use sperm
donors for IVF. Id.
Gay couples who wish to have a child through a surrogate also utilize
IVF. Surrogacy Options for Gay Couples: In Search of a Womb of One’s Own,
IT’S CONCEIVABLE, http://itsconceivablenow.com/surrogacy/ (last visited Mar.
867
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committed to one another and to the unborn child in every way
possible.
Finally, after months of preparation and anticipation, a little
girl is born. Both parents sign the birth certificate at the hospital.
Together, as two equal parents, they begin to raise their daughter.
Father, mother, and daughter live together happily for two
years. Soon though, the parents’ relationship begins to change and
they grow apart. The mother, the only biological parent, decides to
take the child and leave the family home. She files for divorce and
refuses to allow the father to see their daughter.
In such a situation, even though he is not biologically related
to his child, the father has legal remedies at his disposal. He will
petition a family court (likely as part of the divorce proceedings)
for custody and visitation rights so that he can continue to be a
parent to his young daughter. A family court judge will then
determine what is in the best interest of the child,3 and order a
visitation and custody arrangement accordingly.
Now, consider a lesbian couple in that exact situation, but
living in a state that deprives same-sex couples of the right to
enter into a legally recognized relationship. The outcome may be
very different. Despite the fact that the two women decided to
have and raise a child together, once the couple splits up the
family court judge may decide that the biological mother is
completely within her rights to remove the other mother from the
child’s life entirely. Is this fair? Does it make good sense? Most
importantly, is it in the child’s best interest?
This Comment addresses the rights of non-biological same-sex
co-parents facing situations similar to the one described above.4 By
way of example, Part II of this Comment discusses the Ohio
Supreme Court’s decision in In re Mullen,5 a recent case that
exposed the inconsistency and inequality that unmarried gay and
lesbian non-biological parents often face in court. Part II also
presents an overview of the status of this area of the law across
the country. Part III analyzes the Mullen decision in detail, and
will compare how other jurisdictions have handled the rights of
non-legal parents formerly in same-sex relationships. Part III also
24, 2013). In those situations, however, there is the potential for both partners
to be genetically linked to the child. Id.
3. See Fiser & Garrett, supra note 1, at 15 n.79 (noting that courts in all
fifty states apply some form of the “best interest of the child” standard when
adjudicating custody and visitation disputes).
4. This Comment’s scope is limited to situations in which unmarried
same-sex couples make a decision to raise a child together, but the child has a
biological link to only one partner. This Comment will refer interchangeably to
the non-biological parents in such a situation as “non-legal,” “non-biological,”
and “same-sex co-parents.”
5. In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d 302 (Ohio 2011).
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weighs various proposals and solutions6 and analyzes the benefits
and deficiencies they present. Finally, Part IV sets out a proposal
for reform in this area of the law. It argues that non-biological coparents should have standing to petition for visitation and custody
where it is clear that both partners intended to have and raise a
child together. It will provide a uniform method for determining
such intent that does not involve a fact-intensive analysis by a
family court judge. The result is that the inquiry as to visitation
and custody rights will focus only on what is in the best interest of
the child, rather than on the dynamics of the parents’ former
relationship.
II. BACKGROUND
This Section begins with a discussion of one recent example7
of a case in which a homosexual co-parent was denied standing to
petition for custody and visitation rights of the biological child of
her former partner. It then gives other examples of states and
courts that have denied rights in similar situations. Finally, it
discusses various methods that states have implemented to resolve
this issue in favor of recognizing co-parents’ rights.
A. “Momma” in Life, But Not at Law
In the summer of 2011, the Ohio Supreme Court denied a
woman’s petition for parental rights of her lesbian partner’s
biological child.8 Michele Hobbs (“Hobbs”) and Kelly Mullen
6. See, e.g., Fiser & Garrett, supra note 1, at 19 (stating that contract law
presents a possible solution for lesbian parents facing inconsistent or unequal
treatment under the law); Kelly M. O’Bryan, Comment, Mommy or Daddy and
Me: A Contract Solution to a Child’s Loss of the Lesbian or Transgender
Nonbiological Parent, 60 DEPAUL L.REV. 1115, 1147 (2011) (suggesting that
contract law can aide in solving disputes between former lesbian partners, one
of whom is the biological mother of the child that the couple raised together for
some time); Laurie A. Rompala, Abandoned Equity and the Best Interests of
the Child: Why Illinois Courts Must Recognize Same-sex Parents Seeking
Visitation, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1933, 1954 (arguing that Illinois courts
should exercise their equitable powers to allow homosexual non-biological
parents to establish standing to petition for custody and visitation rights).
7. For examples of other such cases, see Guardianship of Z.C.W., 84 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Crandall v. Wagner,
528 U.S. 1056 (1999) (holding that former lesbian partner of biological mother
lacked standing to seek visitation and custody of child born during their
relationship); In re Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(preventing lesbian non-biological mother from establishing standing to seek
visitation and custody).
8. In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d at 304. Under Ohio law, the non-biological
parent has no parentage rights unless the parents made an agreement for
shared permanent legal custody of the child. Id. The only issue for the court to
address, therefore, was whether Kelly Mullen’s conduct created such an
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(“Mullen”) were in a committed relationship9 for approximately
three years when they decided to have a child.10 Together, the
couple decided that Mullen would carry the baby and after finding
a willing sperm donor, they began the IVF process.11
On July 27, 2005, with Hobbs present, Mullen gave birth to
their daughter, Lucy.12 For two years, Hobbs and Mullen raised
their daughter together. They held themselves out as a family and
both women acted as Lucy’s mother, with equal parenting
responsibilities.13 In addition to their conduct,14 numerous
documents indicated that Mullen recognized Hobbs as Lucy’s
mother. These documents included a Donor-Recipient Agreement
on Insemination,15 Ms. Mullen’s Last Will and Testament,16 a
Health Care Power of Attorney,17 and a General Durable Power of
Attorney.18 Lucy called Hobbs “Momma” and it was clear to their
family and friends that both Mullen and Hobbs were Lucy’s
mothers.19
agreement. Id. By finding that there was no agreement, the court effectively
held that Michele Hobbs lacked standing to petition for custody and visitation
rights. Id. at 315 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
9. Brief for Appellant-Petitioner at *1-2, In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d 203
(July 12, 2011) (No. 10-0276), 2010 OH S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 386. The couple
met and began dating in May 2000. They also exchanged rings as a symbol of
their commitment to one another. Id.
10. Id. at *4.
11. Id. at *6-7. The couple jointly paid for fertility treatment. Hobbs
accompanied Mullen to her doctor’s appointments and they attended Lamaze
classes together. Id.
12. Id. at *8.
13. Id. at *8-10.
14. Id. at *16-17. Mullen regularly referred to Hobbs as Lucy’s mother,
once stating “You’re her Momma.” She also referred to Hobbs as Lucy’s
“mother” and “mom” in various greeting cards and e-mails. Additionally,
Mullen “never corrected anyone when they referred to Michele as Lucy’s
mother, momma or mom nor did she do anything to suggest that Ms. Hobbs
was not Lucy’s mother.” Id.
15. Id. at *4-5. Pursuant to this agreement, the IVF sperm-donor agreed
that he would have “no parental rights whatsoever.” The agreement also
“made it clear that any right that [the sperm-donor] might have to
guardianship, custody, or visitation in the event of Ms. Mullen’s death would
be secondary to Ms. Hobbs’s rights.” Id. at *5.
16. Id. at *14. Mullen named Hobbs the executor of Mullen’s will and the
guardian of Lucy’s person and estate. Mullen also stated, “I consider [Hobbs]
to be Lucy’s co-parent in every way.” Id.
17. Id. at *15. This document authorized Hobbs to make health care
decisions for Lucy. Mullen also stated in this document, “I consider Michele
Hobbs to be my child’s co-parent in every way.” Id.
18. Id. This document authorized Hobbs to make decisions regarding
Lucy’s education and living arrangements. Similarly to the other documents,
Mullen again stated, “I consider Michele Hobbs as my child’s co-parent in
every way.” Id.
19. Id. at *13.
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In 2007, Hobbs and Mullen grew apart and eventually ended
their relationship.20 In October 2007, Mullen moved out of the
couple’s home, took Lucy, and prevented Hobbs from seeing her.21
Hobbs subsequently filed a complaint requesting that the court
grant joint custody.22
Following a two-day trial and “extensive post-trial briefing,”23
a magistrate judge granted Hobbs’s request for shared custody and
found that “it was in the child’s best interests to maintain ties
with Hobbs.”24 The juvenile court, however, rejected the
magistrate’s findings, holding that Mullen’s conduct did not
indicate that she desired to relinquish to Hobbs any of her
custodial rights.25 The court of appeals then affirmed that
decision.26 Of particular importance to the court of appeals was the
contested fact that Mullen refused to enter into an agreed court
order with Hobbs.27 The court of appeals held that, “taken as a
whole,”
the
evidence
supported
the
juvenile
court’s

20. Id. at *20-21.
21. Id. at *21.
22. Id. Ohio statutes define “legal custody” as a legal status that vests in
an individual “the right to have physical care and control of the child,” along
with the responsibility to “provide the child with food, shelter, education and
medical care.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.011(B)(21) (West 2011). Two
people may enter into, and a court may determine the validity of, a “shared
custody” arrangement whereby they share those rights and responsibilities.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(2) (West 2011).
Hobbs also filed a motion requesting interim visitation with Lucy while
the proceedings were occurring. Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 9, at
*21. Additionally, Scott Liming, the sperm-donor for the IVF procedure, filed a
complaint for shared custody of Lucy. Id. at *2.
23. Id. at *22.
24. In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d at 305. The magistrate judge also made the
following factual findings: “that Hobbs had actively participated in the
decision and process to have a child, that Mullen and Hobbs had had an
understanding that they would act as equal co-parents” and that Mullen
named Hobbs as an equal co-parent in three separate documents. Id. Due to
these findings, the magistrate judge held that Mullen, through her conduct,
had relinquished partial custody of Lucy to Hobbs. Id. The judge did not,
however, rule on Liming’s petition. Id. at 418 n.1.
25. Id. Importantly, the question of whether Mullen had relinquished any
of her custody rights was one of fact. Id. at 306. The appeals court and the
supreme court, therefore, were operating under a limited standard of review.
They were required to affirm the trial court’s determination “if there [was]
some reliable, credible evidence to support the finding.” Id.
26. Id. at 308.
27. Id. In her brief, Hobbs stated that she and Mullen discussed a formal
court order for shared custody only after their relationship began to
deteriorate. Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 9, at *28. In her
testimony, Mullen stated that the first time the couple discussed a written
custody agreement was not until Lucy was eight months old. In re Mullen, 953
N.E. 2d at 311 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
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determination.28
Hobbs appealed again and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court’s decision.29 The court initially stated that “Ohio
does not recognize a parent’s attempt to enter into a statutory
‘shared parenting’ arrangement with a nonparent, same-sex
partner.”30
As to the facts, the court noted that there was conflicting
evidence as to whether Mullen had intended to share custody of
Lucy with Hobbs,31 but held that, based on the record, it could not
say that the juvenile court erred in its determination.32 The court
also stated that, while not required, the best way for a parent to
cede custody rights to a nonparent is through a formal written
contract.33 It found that the evidence supported the juvenile and
appellate courts’ holdings and therefore affirmed the judgment.34
Despite being Lucy’s “Momma” in real life,35 the Ohio courts
refused to recognize Hobbs as Lucy’s mother.
B. Barriers to Continued Co-Parenting
Ohio is not the only state to deny custody or visitation rights
to non-legal parents who, for all intents and purposes, have acted
as a child’s parent since the child’s birth. The Uniform Parentage
Act (“UPA”),36 which has served as a model for many state statutes
governing parentage rights,37 presents difficulties for and a bias
28. Id.
29. Id. at 309 (majority opinion).
30. Id. at 305. The court stated that the currently applicable Ohio statutes
did not include within the definition of “parent” a nonparent same-sex partner.
Id.
31. Id. at 307.
32. Id. at 308. See also supra note 25 (noting the limited standard of review
under which the court was operating).
33. In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d at 308 (citing In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241
(Ohio 2002)) (stating that “the best way to safeguard both a parent’s and a
nonparent’s rights with respect to children is to agree in writing as to how
custody is to be shared, the manner in which it is shared, and the degree to
which it may be revocable or permanent”).
34. Id. This holding meant that the juvenile court could not reach the
determinations of whether Hobbs was a suitable custodian or whether Hobbs
and Mullen having joint custody was in Lucy’s best interests. Id.
35. Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 9, at *10.
36. The Uniform Parentage Act was originally promulgated in 1973. Unif.
Parentage Act (1973); O’Bryan, supra note 6, at 1121. The UPA was an
attempt to standardize parentage law across the country. It contains
provisions on parent-child relationships, paternity issues, proceedings to
adjudicate parentage, and issues regarding children assisted reproduction,
among others. Id. at 1121-26.
37. John J. Sampson, Uniform Family Laws and Model Acts, 42 FAM. L.Q.
673, 681 (2008). California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, and Rhode Island
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against a same-sex co-parent seeking shared custody of their
former partner’s biological child.
The first version of the UPA was promulgated in 1973 (“UPA
(1973)”).38 Section 5 of the UPA (1973) specifically addresses
children conceived through artificial insemination, but refers to
the potential parents only as “husband” and “wife,” thereby
excluding all unmarried and same sex couples from its
protections.39
Illinois and Ohio present just two examples of how the
inequalities inherent in the UPA (1973) have created statutes that
act as the first major roadblock to a lesbian mother seeking
parentage rights. The plain language of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act makes it extremely difficult for a
former same-sex partner of a biological mother to petition for
custody or visitation.40 The Ohio statutes explicitly give a woman’s
husband rights that a woman’s same-sex partner would not have
in the same situation.41
The UPA was revised in 2000 (“UPA (2000)”) because the
creators felt that “the law needed to keep up with new technologies
and resulting legal issues, such as the increased use of assisted
conception.”42 Even with that goal in mind, the UPA (2000) still
referred only to “husband” and “wife” when addressing artificial
insemination issues,43 and maintained an overall bias in favor of
conventional heterosexual relationships.44
all enacted some form of the UPA (1973). Id. Alabama, Delaware, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming all enacted
some form of the UPA (2000). O’Bryan, supra note 6, at 1125 n.87.
38. Unif. Parentage Act (1973); O’Bryan, supra note 6, at 1121.
39. Unif. Parentage Act (1973). Under the Act, if “a wife is inseminated
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is
treated in law as if her were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”
Id.; O’Bryan, supra note 6, at 1121.
40. 750 ILCS 5/601(b)(2) (West 2005). The Act provides that a nonparent
has standing to petition for custody only when the child is not in the physical
custody of one of his natural or legal parents. In re R.L.S., 844 N.E.2d 22, 27
(Ill. 2006); In re Guardianship of Alexander O., 783 N.E.2d 673, 678 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2003); In re Marriage of Siegel, 648 N.E.2d 607, 610 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
41. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95 (West 2001). The law states that so
long as a husband consents to his wife’s artificial insemination, a legal
presumption arises that he is “the natural father of a child conceived as a
result of the artificial insemination, and a child so conceived shall be treated
in law and regarded as the natural child of the husband.” Id. There is no such
provision protecting the rights of same-sex partners of biological parents.
42. O’Bryan, supra note 6, at 1124-25.
43. Id. at 1125.
44. See Unif. Parentage Act (2000), Article 7 (concerning the parentage of
children born through “assisted reproduction”). The titles of the sections in
Article 7 include, “Husband’s Paternity of Child of Assisted Reproduction” and
“Limitation on Husband’s Dispute of Paternity.” Id. at §§ 703, 705. Article 7
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In 2002, the UPA (2000) was amended to include children
born out of wedlock.45 Although such an amendment may indicate
a trend toward more inclusive statutory language, the model law—
and states that followed its lead—still did not extend protections
to homosexual co-parents.46 For example, in New Mexico, a state
that has adopted a version of the UPA (2000),47 an appellate court
held that the former lesbian partner of an adoptive mother did not
have standing to seek custody of the child even though the former
partner assisted in raising the child since the time of adoption.48
Needless to say, same-sex co-parents face a difficult uphill battle
in many states. Fortunately, though, this is not the case in every
state throughout the country.
C. Recognizing the Rights of Non-legal Co-Parents
A number of state court decisions have started to open the
door for gay and lesbian co-parents seeking parentage rights. One
of the dissenting opinions49 in Mullen noted one such decision
when arguing that the majority misapplied its own precedent.50
uses only “wife” when speaking of the mother of the child and does not make
any mention of same-sex couples. Id.
45. Unif. Parentage Act (2000), Article 7; O’Bryan, supra note 6, at 1125.
46. Id. The Unif. Parentage Act (2000) changed references to potential
parents from “husband” and “wife” to “man” and “woman,” yet does not
address the possibility of a same-sex couple having a child. Id.
47. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1978, 40-11A-703, § 40-4-9.1(K) (West 2003).
48. Chatterjee v. King, 253 P.3d 915, 926 (N.M. App. Ct. 2010). This
holding was based on the court’s interpretation of the relevant custody statute,
which states: “When a person other than a natural or adoptive parent seeks
custody of the child, no such person shall be awarded custody absent a
showing of unfitness of the natural or adoptive parent.” Id.; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-4-9.1(K). The court recognized that a nonparent may be awarded custody
under the statute, over the objections of the parent, under extraordinary
circumstances. Chatterjee, 253 P.3d at 922-23. The court found, however, that
the potential psychological harm to the child that the petitioner alleged would
occur if she were not granted custody was insufficient to reach the
“extraordinary circumstances” contemplated by the Supreme Court of New
Mexico. Id. at 923. The court held, therefore, that under the plain language of
the statute, the petitioner had no standing to seek custody of the child. Id. at
925.
Notably, however, the court subsequently held that the legislature did
not limit visitation in the same way it limited custody. Id. at 926-27. While it
did not grant visitation to the former partner, it held that she had standing to
petition the juvenile court for visitation rights. Id. at 928. The court stated
that the trial court has the discretion to determine whether granting visitation
to the nonparent would be in the best interests of the child. Id.
49. There were three dissenting justices and two dissenting opinions. In re
Mullen, 953 N.E.2d at 309 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 311 (Pfeifer, J.,
dissenting).
50. See id. at 311-15 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s
over reliance on Bonfield was inappropriate because there, the parties did not
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The dissenter argued that the majority should have followed the
path set out by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re Custody of
H.S.H.-K.51
In 1995, on facts52 similar to those of Mullen, the Wisconsin
high court held that a non-legal parent may obtain standing to
petition a juvenile court for shared visitation if the non-legal
parent can establish: that the legal parent consented to a “parentlike relationship” between the child and non-legal parent; that the
non-legal parent and child lived together; that the non-legal
parent took on the responsibilities of parenting; and that the nonlegal parent has acted like a parent long enough to establish a
“dependent relationship” with the child.53
dispute co-parent status, and simply sought to submit their shared-parent
agreement to the juvenile court for a “child’s best interests determination;”
whereas here, the parties disputed co-parent status and sought a
determination of whether the legal parent had ceded custody).
51. Id.; In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
52. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419. Sandra Holtzman and
Elisabeth Knott were in a committed relationship for more than ten years. Id.
About four years into their relationship, the couple began the artificial
insemination process. Id. Once Knott became pregnant, the couple attended
all obstetrician visits and birthing classes together. Id. Knott gave birth to a
boy on December 15, 1988. Id. Both Knott and Holtzman represented
themselves and one another as their son’s equal co-parents. Id. at 422.
Holtzman’s parents were recognized as the boy’s grandparents and Holtzman’s
sister was named the boy’s godmother. Id. For about five years, the two shared
parenting responsibilities, and Holtzman provided most of the financial
support for the family. Id.
The family moved in late 1992, and by early 1993 the couple had
decided that their relationship was over. Id. They initially decided to continue
living together for their son’s sake, but a few months later Knott moved out
and took the boy with her. Id. Shortly thereafter, Knott filed for a restraining
order to keep Holtzman from seeing their son. Id. In response, Holtzman filed
petitions for custody and visitation. Id.
Though it appeared that the circuit court judge felt compelled to grant
Holtzman’s petitions, he stated that the law would not allow him to do so. Id.
Holtzman appealed, and her petition to bypass the appellate court was
granted. Id. at 423.
53. Id. at 435-36. More specifically, the court held that the petitioning nonlegal parent must establish:
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the
petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship
with the child; (2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the
same household; (3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of
parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care,
education and development, including contributing towards the child’s
support, without the expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that
the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient
to have established with the child a bonded dependent relationship
parental in nature.
Id. Importantly, the court’s ruling only establishes the requirements that a coparent must meet to have standing to petition the court for custody or
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Importantly, the court found Wisconsin’s visitation statutes
inapplicable,54 as it referred only to situations involving a
dissolution of marriage.55 Instead, the court used its equitable
powers to fashion the test for determining whether a “parent-like”
relationship exists.56
Wisconsin is not alone in recognizing non-biological parents’
rights in this way. In 2005, for example, in the case of In re
Parentage of L.B.,57 the Washington Supreme Court held that
factors similar to those used in H.S.H.-K can establish de facto
parent status.58 The facts59 were again similar to those in H.S.H.K. and Mullen. After the Superior Court denied the non-biological
parent’s petition for parentage and visitation rights,60 the Court of
Appeals reversed61 and the case was appealed to the Washington
Supreme Court. After a lengthy analysis, the court concluded that
the state’s common law allowed for, and the United States
Constitution did not prevent, the establishment of de facto parent
status.62 The court remanded the case63 to the trial court for a
visitation. Id. The trial court must then make a determination based on what
is in the best interests of the child. Id. at 436.
54. Id. at 430; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1) (2007).
55. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 430.
56. Id. at 434.
57. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005).
58. The term de facto parent typically refers to a person who, though not
biologically related to a child, psychologically and functionally acts as the
child’s parent. O’Bryan, supra note 6, at 1131.
59. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 163. Page Britain and Sue Ellen
Carvin lived together for five years. They decided to have a child and together
went through the IVF process, impregnating Britain with sperm donated by a
male friend. Id. Britain gave birth to a girl, and together the couple raised her
for six years. Id. The couple subsequently ended their relationship, and for
approximately a year thereafter, they shared parenting responsibilities and
custody of their daughter. Id. at 164. Then, Britain “unilaterally terminated
all of Carvin’s contact with [their daughter].” Id. Carvin petitioned with the
Superior Court seeking establishment of parentage. Id.
60. Id. Carvin alleged that she was a legal parent under Washington’s
Uniform Parentage Act and that she should be recognized as a de facto parent,
or alternatively, that she be granted third party visitation rights. The
Superior Court dismissed Carvin’s petition on all three grounds, stating that
Carvin had no standing under the UPA nor as a de facto parent, and denied
Carvin’s visitation petition because there was no showing that Britain was
unfit as a parent. Id. at 165.
61. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding
that while Carvin lacked standing under the Uniform Parentage Act, she
could, at the trial court level, establish herself as a common law de facto
parent by meeting requirements similar to those used in H.S.H.-K.
Additionally, the appellate court held that Carvin did not need “to prove that
Britain is unfit in the classic sense, but only that it is detrimental to the child
to sever the . . . parent-child relationship” to petition the court for visitation.
Id.
62. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 175. A de facto parent is a non-legal
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determination of whether the mother was a de facto parent.64 At
least two other states’ high courts have held similarly.65
Some courts have looked to similar factors, without adopting
a specific set of requirements, to determine that non-legal parents
in same-sex relationships have standing to seek custody or
visitation.66 Other courts have held that their existing statutes
implicitly support recognition the rights of non-biological
parents.67
There is also some direct statutory support for a broader
recognition of co-parent status and rights. In July 2009, Delaware
enacted a statute that may grant legal parentage to the same-sex
parent who, because of the relationship he or she has with the child, stands in
“legal parity” with the legal parent. Id. at 177.
The court analyzed de facto parent status in light of Constitutional
considerations, most importantly those raised in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57 (2000). Troxel held that the United States Constitution requires a
presumption that a fit parent acts in the child’s best interests. Troxel, 530 U.S.
at 68-69. That case also stands for the proposition that a legal parent has
fundamental rights—paramount to any potential rights of a nonparent—to
make child rearing decisions. Id. at 57.
63. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 176. The supreme court also
reversed the appellate court on the issue of third party visitation, holding that
the statute which provides for such a petition is unconstitutional. Id.
64. Id. at 176 (citing In re Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d at 285 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2004)). The court adopted the same four factors for determining of de
facto parentage as those used by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
determining co-parent status. Id.
65. See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1991) and V.C. v.
M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 553 (N.J. 2000) (holding that a lesbian non-biological
parent may establish de facto parent status and thus have standing to seek
visitation and custody rights).
66. See, e.g., Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010) (holding that
where a biological mother brought a nonparent same-sex partner into the
family unit, represented that the nonparent was a parent, and allowed the
nonparent to go through adoption proceedings, nonparent had standing to
petition juvenile court for custody, even though the adoption was void because
it was barred by state statute).
67. Courts in California and Oregon present two such examples. In Elisa
B. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court concluded that the former
same-sex partner of the biological mother of two children was presumed a
parent under the California UPA. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660,
670 (Cal. 2005). Although the statute provided a standard establishing only a
father-child relationship, the court found that provision to be applicable to a
mother-child relationship, as well. Id. at 666-67. Therefore, it held that a child
can have two parents, both of whom are women. Id.
In Shineovich v. Kemp, an Oregon appellate court held that where a
woman consents to the artificial insemination of her same-sex domestic
partner with the intent of being the child’s parent, she is presumed to be the
parent. 214 P.3d 29, 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). The court included the children of
mothers in same-sex relationships within the scope of the relevant statute,
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (West 2011), which previously applied only to
children of heterosexual couples. Id.
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partner of the biological or adoptive parent.68 A person is a de facto
parent under the statute if he or she meets requirements that are
almost identical to those established in H.S.H.-K. and L.B.69
Kentucky enacted a similar statute in 2010.70
While this type of progress is encouraging, for many, the fight
is still not over. The Delaware statute, for example, may be under
attack,71 even though it was enacted in response to a Delaware
Supreme Court decision denying de facto parent status.72 Many
non-biological parents are still lacking the equality under the law
that they deserve.
III. ANALYSIS
This Section discusses the specific problems with the decision
in Mullen. It then discusses both the strengths and weaknesses of
other approaches to this issue. Finally, it will explain the
importance of this issue and why it must be addressed quickly and
consistently.

68. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 13 § 8-201(a)(4) (West 2013).
69. Id. To be considered a de facto parent under the statute, the parent
must show that she:
(1) Has had the support and consent of the child’s parent or parents who
fostered the formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship
between the child and the de facto parent;
(2) Has exercised parental responsibility for the child as that term is
defined in § 1101 of this title; and
(3) Has acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have
established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is
parental in nature.
Id.
70. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1)(a) (West 2010), states:
“[D]e facto custodian” means a person who has been shown by clear and
convincing evidence to have been the primary caregiver for, and
financial supporter of, a child who has resided with the person for a
period of six (6) months or more if the child is under three (3) years of
age and for a period of one (1) year or more if the child is three (3) years
of age or older or has been placed by the Department for Community
Based Services.
Id.
71. Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 748-50 (Del. Fam. Ct., 2010). In
2010, a family court held the statute to be unconstitutional. The court denied a
mother’s boyfriend, who was not the father, de facto parent status for purposes
of his custody petition for his girlfriend’s child. The court held the statute
unconstitutional as violative of a biological parent’s paramount rights
regarding child rearing and custody. Id. at 740-50 (relying on Troxel, 530 U.S.
57).
72. Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child:
Parentage Laws for Children of Lebsian Couples in the Twenty First Century, 5
STAN. J.CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 201, 223-224 (2009).
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A. Flaws in Mullen’s Analysis
With the exception of the magistrate court,73 the Mullen
courts were misguided in their approaches to resolving the difficult
issue presented. The juvenile court began down the wrong path
when it focused on the fact that Hobbs and Mullen never entered
into a shared custody court order.74 The juvenile court found this
to be the “most important” fact75 and found that it outweighed all
the evidence to the contrary.76 The juvenile court also found that
the sperm donor, Scott Liming, was the child’s father. It held that
he had the opportunity to obtain custody rights,77 despite the fact
that he had explicitly relinquished those rights when he became
the couple’s sperm donor,78 and despite the statutory bar to such a
donor obtaining parental rights.79
The appellate court followed the juvenile court’s lead. It
acknowledged that the trial court gave significant importance to
“the fact [that] Mullen had repeatedly refused to enter into a
legally enforceable shared-custody agreement with Hobbs when

73. Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 9, at *23-24. “Weighing the
competing versions, the Magistrate found that ‘the evidence and testimony
demonstrate that Ms. Mullen and Ms. Hobbs had an understanding that they
would act as equal co-parents for the child.’” Id. (internal citation omitted).
The magistrate concluded that Mullen had relinquished her right to exclusive
custody and that Hobbs should remain a part of her child’s life. Id.
74. Id. at *26. The juvenile court found that Mullen “refused repeatedly” to
enter into a shared custody court order, thereby declining to give up any
custodial rights to Hobbs. Id. The juvenile court made this determination,
which was contrary to that of the magistrate, based solely on a review of the
transcript (i.e. without personally observing any witness statements). Id. at
*25.
75. Id. at *26.
76. Id. The evidence to the contrary included the various writings that
indicated Mullen’s desire for Hobbs to be a co-parent as well as the couple’s
conduct in relation to one another, their daughter, and their friends and
family. See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text (detailing the documents
and conduct).
77. In re Mullen, 924 N.E.2d at 450. A discussion of the rights of the sperm
donors in these situations is outside the scope of this Comment. The juvenile
court’s statements regarding Liming, however, are important here to
demonstrate that the judge was willing to recognize his rights before Hobbs’s,
even though that recognition was likely incorrect. See infra notes 79 and 80
and accompanying text (explaining the appellate court’s rationale).
78. Id.; see also, Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 9, at *23-24
(arguing that “the Donor-Recipient Agreement also made it clear that any
right Mr. Liming might have to guardianship, custody, or visitation in the
event of Ms. Mullen’s death would be secondary to Ms. Hobbs’s rights”).
79. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95 (West 2011) (stating that where a
woman undergoes non-spousal artificial insemination, the donor “shall not be
treated in law or regarded as the natural father of a child conceived as a result
of the artificial insemination”).
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presented the opportunity to do so.”80 In addition, the appellate
court made a point to note that the numerous documents81 that
referred to Hobbs’s co-parentage rights “were given at Mullen’s
discretion, and Mullen always retained the unilateral right to
revoke them.”82
Just as the lower courts did, the Ohio Supreme Court cited
the lack of a formal custody agreement between Hobbs and Mullen
as the basis for its holding.83 The court also advised that “the best
way to safeguard both a parent’s and non-parent’s rights with
respect to children” is either to enter into a formal, written
agreement or to apply for a court order that clearly establishes
“how custody is to be shared, the manner in which it is shared,
and the degree to which it may be revocable or permanent.”84 In
the next breath, however, the court noted that Ohio law does not
require a written contract to relinquish custody rights.85
Most problematic to each court’s analysis was the intense
focus on the “fact”86 that Mullen never agreed to apply for a court
ordered custody arrangement nor enter into a formal custody

80. In re Mullen, 924 N.E.2d at 450. It is important to note, however, that
the “fact” to which the court referred, regarding the “repeated” refusals and
their timing, was disputed at the trial in the magistrate court. See supra note
27 (explaining the contradictory evidence and testimony regarding discussions
to enter into such an agreement).
81. See supra notes 15-18 (detailing the documents that referred to Hobbs
as a co-parent, which included Mullen’s will, a Health Care Power of Attorney,
and Durable Power of Attorney).
82. In re Mullen, 924 N.E.2d at 460.
83. In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d 302, 308.
84. Id. at 308 (citing In re Bonfield, 97 Ohio St. 3d at 387; Masitto v.
Masitto, 22 Ohio St. 3d 63 (1986)). In Bonfield, a lesbian couple petitioned the
juvenile court for recognition of a shared parenting agreement. In re Bonfield,
97 Ohio St. 3d at 388. One of the women had two adopted children and three
whom she gave birth to after artificial insemination. Id. After the juvenile
court dismissed their petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of
Ohio held first that the Ohio statutes did not allow the legal mother’s partner
to be considered a “parent” for purposes of a shared parenting agreement. Id.
at 393. However, because the couple had clearly and explicitly agreed, in
writing, upon a shared custody arrangement, the court held that the juvenile
court could make a determination of whether shared custody would be in the
best interests of the children. Id.
In Masitto, the Supreme Court of Ohio found that where a father had
relinquished his right to sole custody of his children in favor of the children’s
grandparents. Masitto, 22 Ohio St. 3d at 67. There, the court the father had
consented, in writing, to the appointment of the grandparents as the children’s
guardians. Id. at 64. The court held that this was sufficient to indicate that
the father had relinquished his custody rights in favor of the grandparents. Id.
at 67.
85. In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d at 308.
86. The term “fact” is in quotations here because it refers to an issue that
was disputed between the parties. Supra note 25 and corresponding text.
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agreement.87 It was imprudent for the courts to rely on the lack of
a formal agreement for a number of reasons. First, there was
significant dispute over the facts that led to the courts’ conclusion
that Mullen’s refusal to enter into a formal custody agreement was
indicative of her desire to retain sole custody rights.88 Second, and
more importantly, the amount of evidence indicating the
affirmative steps the couple took to equate their status as
parents89 makes it troubling that the courts gave such deference to
an action the couple did not take.90 The courts ignored all the
actions Mullen took to relinquish her sole custody rights, while
simultaneously citing the lack of a certain piece of evidence as the
most telling sign that she had not relinquished those rights.91
The Mullen court was also misguided in its analysis of the
term “co-parent.” It stated that designating an individual as a coparent is not equivalent to relinquishing custody rights in favor of
that individual.92 The court found that the term “co-parent” is
subject to “many different arrangements and degrees of
permanency,” but cited no case law or examples demonstrating
such a broad use of the term.93
The court went on to state, however, that the use of “coparent” can indicate a relinquishment of custody rights if the
surrounding circumstances and evidence support that indication.94
It is surprising, then, that the court did not find such
circumstances existing between Mullen and Hobbs. No
interpretation of the documents in which Mullen referred to Hobbs
87. In re Mullen, 924 N.E.2d at 451; In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 307-08.
88. See supra notes 25 and 73 and corresponding text (explaining that
there was evidence of an intent to co-parent and that Mullen waived her right
to parent exclusively); see also, In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d at 311 (Pfeifer, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the court relied in error upon Mullen’s refusals
because no matter which side of the disputed facts is taken as true, “Mullen
had made clear long before any discussion about a Bonfield-like agreement
that she considered Hobbs a co-parent”).
89. See supra notes 14-18 and corresponding text (noting that Hobbs and
Mullen executed a number of documents which stated that Hobbs was a coparent, their daughter called Hobbs “Mommy,” and the couple held themselves
out to be a family and Hobbs to be their daughters mother).
90. See In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d at 311 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (arguing
that “the trial court gave improper weight to a document that did not exist and
improperly ignored the documents that did exist”).
91. In re Mullen, 924 N.E.2d at 451; see also, In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d at
307 (referring to the fact that Hobbs and Mullen never entered into a normal
custody agreement and did not seek a court order regarding a custody
arrangement).
92. In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d at 308. (holding that “‘[c]oparenting’ is not
synonymous with an agreement by the biological parent to permanently
relinquish sole custody in favor of shared legal parenting.”).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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as a co-parent can support the conclusion that Mullen believed
Hobbs would be a temporary co-parent.95 The multiple references
to Hobbs as “co-parent” in the various legal documents Mullen
executed96 should have been taken to mean exactly what they
stated: that Hobbs was a co-parent “in every way.”97 The Ohio
courts’ failure to recognize custody rights as falling within the
phrase “in every way” was a mistake and was contrary to common
sense.
The final part of the courts’ misguided analysis in this case
started with the juvenile court’s determination that by revoking
the documents that referenced Hobbs as a co-parent Mullen
indicated that she never intended Hobbs to retain any custody
rights.98 Mullen revoked these documents not only after the couple
had split, but also after Mullen and Lucy had moved out of the
couple’s home.99 The court should have been more concerned with
Mullen’s intent at the time the documents were signed, and less
concerned with Mullen’s unilateral actions once she had moved out
of the couple’s home.100
B. Contract-Based Proposals
For reasons that will be explained, the Mullen court and other
commentators101 have given undue weight to contract-based
solutions to this problem. The Ohio Supreme Court stated that the
“best way to safeguard” the parentage rights of a non-parent is to
enter into a very specific type of agreement.102 Creating a
document that clearly indicates the intent to recognize a nonbiological parent as a parent may well be the safest way to make
sure those intentions are honored. The court’s focus, however, was
95. Id. at 312 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (noting that “Mullen’s statement was
a way to show the world that Mullen and Hobbs intended to raise Lucy
together, equally” and arguing that “an agreement that another person is a coparent in every way” necessarily includes a right to custody).
96. Supra notes 13-17.
97. Id.; In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d at 312 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
98. See id. (indicating that the juvenile court placed emphasis on the
revocability of the documents designating Hobbs as a co-parent); see also, In re
Mullen, 924 N.E.2d at 451 (noting that the juvenile court found that “Mullen
always retained the unilateral right to revoke [the documents]”).
99. In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d at 312 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (explaining
that “[n]ot until the pair separated after Lucy’s second birthday did Mullen
revoke the statement, ‘I consider Michele Hobbs as my co-parent in every
way.’”).
100. See id. (arguing that the court should not have relied on Mullen’s
actions after the couple split because “the question before the court was
whether Mullen agreed to share custody of her child with Hobbs, not whether
she eventually came to regret that decision”).
101. Infra note 107.
102. Id. at 308.
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mistakenly narrow when it considered the type of writing that
would be acceptable.
On multiple occasions, Mullen clearly indicated—in writing
and with an attorney’s assistance—that she considered Hobbs to
be Lucy’s mother.103 The court found all of that to be
insufficient.104 Under the court’s reasoning, for Hobbs to have
standing to seek custody rights, she would have needed to obtain a
court order recognizing those rights.105 Alternatively, Mullen
would have needed to sign a document explicitly stating, “I
permanently relinquish my sole custody rights in favor of Ms.
Hobbs.”106
The Ohio courts are not alone in suggesting that this
contract-based approach is the best way to resolve custody issues
in these situations.107 And to be sure, there is nothing inherently
wrong with using contractual agreements as a way to protect the
rights of a non-legal parent. If executed properly, there is no
reason for courts to refuse to recognize them.108
Proposing this as the best or only solution, however, is
disingenuous. One problem with the written agreement solution in
Mullen was that the court left unclear exactly what type of
agreement would constitute a valid transfer of custody rights to
the non-legal parent.109 The court’s other suggestion, that couples
103. Supra notes 13-17 and corresponding text. An attorney assisted Mullen
in executing the will, health-care power of attorney, and durable power of
attorney. In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d at 307.
104. In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d at 308.
105. Id.
106. See id. (stating that despite the documents and conduct to the contrary,
“Mullen did not create an agreement to permanently relinquish sole legal
custody of her child in favor of shared legal custody with Hobbs”).
107. See O’Bryan, supra note 6, at 1147-48 (suggesting that in order to avoid
future custody battles, couples should enter into pre-insemination agreements
that “establish that the biological parent’s partner, or the nonbiological
parent, is an equal co-parent to the resulting child”). See also, Fiser & Garret,
supra note 1, at 27 (arguing that where a same-sex couple exerts “a great
amount of thought and often significant financial outlay” and together agrees
to conceive through artificial insemination, “deliberate parties should have
their agreements enforced”).
108. See O’Bryan, supra note 6, at 1148 (noting that many courts are
already recognizing such agreements); see also, In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d at
308 (stating that these contractual agreements are the preferred method for
protecting rights).
109. Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d at 312 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). The dissent
questions what exactly the majority means when it describes the
recommended written agreement:
Is it not enough to say that the natural parent is ceding partial custody
to the nonparent so that the two can raise the child together equally? Is
the couple to describe in a legal document how they expect the family to
develop? . . . Must they define roles? Must they establish a visitation
schedule to use after an eventual break-up, before a baby is even
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seek a court order establishing the scope of custody awarded to
each partner, is also flawed in that it removes the decision from
the couple’s hands and places it in the hands of a judge.110
Another major problem with this approach is that many
same-sex couples who wish to have a child together will not (and
should not be expected to) have the foresight to plan for a future
break-up and custody battle by executing a formal contract. Hobbs
and Mullen, for example, had no reason to believe that their
relationship would be temporary.111 Requiring a same-sex couple
to enter into a formal contract-type custody agreement should be
unnecessary, especially when that couple intends to remain in a
committed relationship, puts significant thought into having a
child and starting a family, and takes affirmative steps to
acknowledge both partners as parents of the child.112
C. Other Approaches to Establishing Co-Parent Standing
Courts and legislatures in some states have found
alternatives to the contract-based solution.113 All of these
approaches allow a non-legal parent to establish standing to seek
custody and visitation by demonstrating—through varying, yet
similar requirements—that he or she has acted as a child’s
parent.114
These solutions are a step in the right direction. By focusing
on the relationship between the non-legal parent and the child,
brought home from the hospital?
Id. at 312-13.
110. Id. The dissent notes that if the juvenile court judge does not “bless”
the couple’s relationship or custody agreement, then the “nonparent is left
with nothing.” Id. at 313. See Fiser & Garrett, supra note 1, at 10 (noting the
limitations of a resolution based on interpretation by “individual judges”).
111. See Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 6, at *2-3 (noting that
Hobbs and Mullen were a “committed couple in an intimate relationship,” and
that “[a]t one point, they bought and exchanged rings as a symbol of their
commitment to one another”).
112. See In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d 312 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (noting that a
Bonfield-type agreement was not necessary and that the lack of a such an
agreement “does not negate the fact that an agreement to share custody
already existed before Lucy was even born”).
113. See, e.g., In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 435-36 (allowing
non-legal parents to obtain standing to petition for parentage rights under
Wisconsin law by satisfying a four-part test); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d
at 176-77 (holding that a non-legal parent in Washington who satisfies an
identical four-part test is a de facto parent and stands in “legal parity with an
otherwise legal parent”); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d at 892 (holding that a
lesbian non-legal parent may establish de facto parent status and have
standing to seek visitation and custody rights); DEL. CODE ANN., 13 § 8201(a)(4) (codifying de facto parent status using criteria similar to H.S.H.-K.
and L.B.).
114. Supra notes 55, 61, 64, 65, 67 and 69 and corresponding text.
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this approach manages to protect that parent’s rights, while
simultaneously recognizing the importance and benefits of
maintaining the relationship that parent has fostered with his or
her child.
Moreover, this approach continues to protect the rights of the
biological parent by allowing a juvenile court to conduct a close
examination of the parent’s involvement in the child’s life. If the
court determines that the parent has not had sufficient
involvement, it may still refrain from recognizing the non-legal
parent’s rights. The test ensures that the non-legal parent is, for
all intents and purposes, the child’s parent and has acted
accordingly.115 Furthermore, even if the non-legal parent meets
these requirements, the court must still determine that joint
custody is in the best interests of the child. There is virtually no
risk that custody would be shared wrongly or unfairly under these
tests. Most importantly, these tests shift the main focus of the
inquiry from the relationship (or subsequent lack thereof and any
resulting animosity116) of the partners, to the relationship between
the co-parent and the child.117
115. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 435-36. The test ensures this
by requiring that the biological parent consented to the establishment of a
parent-like relationship; that the non-legal parent and child lived together;
that the non-legal parent assumed responsibilities of parenthood; and that the
non-legal parent has held a parental role for a sufficient period of time. See
also In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d at 312 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (noting that the
H.S.H.-K. test ensures that a non-legal parent cannot gain custody without
“first having a significant, parent-like relationship with that child that the
natural parent allowed and encouraged”); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at
177 (using an almost identical test, “recognition of a de facto parent is ‘limited
to those adults who have fully and completely undertaken a permanent,
unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in a child’s life’”)
(internal citation omitted). The L.B. court also noted that some critics argue
that this type of test may become a slippery slope, through which any adult
close to a child could petition for visitation and/or custody rights. Id. at 179.
The court refuted that argument, though, by stating that a critical component
of the test is that the biological or legal parent “‘consented to and fostered’ the
parent-child relationship.” Id.
116. In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d at 312 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). The dissent
points out that Lucy’s best interests never even entered the conversation as
the courts attempted to resolve the dispute. Instead, “Mullen’s self-interests”
and the women’s relationship status were the biggest factors in determining
the outcome of this case. Id.
117.
See id. at 314 (noting that under the H.S.H.-K. test, “a natural
parent’s decision to end her relationship with a co-parent would not obviate
the reality of a child’s relationship with a co-parent.”). The Mullen dispute
arose when Mullen and Hobbs ended their relationship and Mullen left with
Lucy. Id. at 304 (majority opinion). Under an H.S.H.-K.-type test, the coparent’s relationship with the child would be reviewed independent of the coparent’s relationship with the biological parent. Id. at 314 (Pfeifer, J.,
dissenting).
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Still, these solutions are not without problems of their own.
The most glaring of those problems is that the test-based approach
leaves much up to the discretion and interpretation of a single
family court judge. Nearly all of the courts and legislatures that
have recognized a non-legal parent’s right to petition for visitation
and custody require showing that the biological parent consented
to and intended for the non-legal parent’s acquisition of such a
right.118 While this is clearly an important part of any such
inquiry, the determination of whether that consent and intent
existed need not fall within the family court’s fact-finding
discretion. As the Proposal Section of this Comment demonstrates,
courts can easily and consistently determine a couple’s intent as to
parentage rights, even in the absence of a formal written custody
agreement or court order.
D. A Problem with Growing Importance and Urgency
Michele Hobbs’s story is not uncommon. As more children are
born to and adopted by lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) couples,119 this issue will only become more prevalent.
There are currently seventeen jurisdictions that allow samesex couples to enjoy the same legal rights as married heterosexual
couples.120 Where a same-sex couple has entered a legally118. See, e.g., In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 435 (requiring the
non-biological parent to show “that the biological or adoptive parent consented
to, and fostered, the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like
relationship with the child”); see In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 176
(requiring a showing that “the natural or legal parent consented to and
fostered the parent-like relationship”).
119. Movement Advancement Project, Family Equality Council & Center for
American Progress, LGBT FAMILIES: FACTS AT A GLANCE 2 (October 2011),
available
at
http://action.familyequality.org/site/DocServer/AllChildrenMatterFactsFinal
10192011.pdf?docID=2404 [hereinafter LGBT FACTS AT A GLANCE] (stating
that “[a]n estimated two million children are [currently] being raised in LGBT
families” and that the number is on the rise). See also Movement
Advancement Project, Family Equality Council & Center for American
Progress, ALL CHILDREN MATTER: HOW LEGAL AND SOCIAL INEQUALITIES
HURT
LGBT
FAMILIES
7
(October
2011),
available
at
http://action.familyequality.org/site/DocServer/AllChildrenMatterFullFinal102
12011.pdf?docID=2401 [hereinafter ALL CHILDREN MATTER] (indicating that
reports on the number of children being raised in LGBT homes vary from two
million to 2.8 million). One-third of lesbian women, over half of gay men, and
close to three-quarters of bisexual men and women without children state that
they want to have children. LGBT FACTS AT A GLANCE, supra, at 2.
120. Id. As of the writing of this Comment, same-sex marriage is legal in
Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
York, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia. Where State Laws
Stand, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/wherestate-laws-stand (last visited April 1, 2013). Civil unions or domestic
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recognized relationship, the law presumes that both the biological
parent and the consenting homosexual partner are the parents of
the child born through IVF.121 Other same-sex couples with
children do not enjoy such a presumption.122 Additionally, in many
cases individuals in these situations are unaware of what, if any,
rights they have.123 Inconsistency and inequality also exists with
respect to adoption laws throughout the country.124
Ensuring that LGB125 parents are treated equally and
consistently under the law becomes particularly important when
one considers how current obstacles affect these families. Research
shows that LGB parents are just as capable as their heterosexual
counterparts,126 and that their children have equally positive
outcomes.127
Still,
these
unconventional
families
face
discrimination, stigma,128 unequal access to healthcare,129 and

partnerships that provide the same rights and responsibilities of marriage are
available to same-sex couples in California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Nevada, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. Id. Rhode Island and New Mexico
explicitly recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages. Id.
121. LGBT FACTS AT A GLANCE, supra note 119, at 3.
122. See id. (noting that “over a dozen” states have laws that allow a nonlegal parent to acquire parental rights in custody disputes). Non-biological
parents seeking parentage rights of children born to their same-sex partners
through IVF face inconsistent laws and court decisions. Id. Individuals
seeking to adopt the children of their same-sex partners are also treated
unequally and inconsistently. Id. Fifteen states expressly allow for such an
adoption, but “[i]n the 35 remaining states, this option does not exist.” Id.
123. See id. at 4 (explaining that “[a] patchwork of statutory and case law
creates deep uncertainty for [lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender]
families.”).
124.
See id. at 3 (stating that seventeen states expressly allow joint
adoption by same-sex couples, five have banned such adoption, and the law is
silent in the remaining states, “creating uncertainty for families”).
125. See ALL CHILDREN MATTER, supra note 119, at 11 (explaining that
“transgender” is a term that does not necessarily refer to one’s sexuality).
Transgender individuals may be in a same-sex or heterosexual relationship.
Id. Therefore, for purposes of noting differences between same-sex and
heterosexual couples, the acronym “LGB” is used in reference to same-sex
couples.
126. Id. “All leading child health and social service organizations support
LGB parenting.” Id. Children of LGB parents are just as physically and
psychologically healthy as those raised by heterosexual parents. Id. at 12. In
fact, some research shows that children of LGB parents are better adjusted
than those raised by heterosexual parents. Id.
127. See id. at 6 (noting that “nearly every major authority on child health
and social services” agrees that children of LGB parents show no differences
from those raised by heterosexual parents in measures of health and
happiness, and are just as well-adjusted as other children).
128. See LGBT FACTS AT A GLANCE, supra note 119, at 5 (asserting that
LGBT families must deal with “inappropriate questions, the politicization of
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unequal tax burdens.130 Preventing further trauma by allowing
both parents to remain a part of a child’s life is extremely
important. This is a pressing issue that legislatures must quickly
address and remedy.
IV. PROPOSAL
The patchwork of statutes and judge-made law surrounding
the rights of homosexual co-parents leaves many facing inequality
and inconsistency when attempting to assert their parentage
rights. This Section suggests ways by which the law can be made
consistent131 and the resolution of these disputes can center on the
best interest of the child.
A. Approaching the Issues with More Common Sense
Many, including the Mullen court, have suggested that the
best way same-sex couples can solve this problem is by entering
into shared custody agreements.132 Again, while a contract-based
solution would suffice in some cases, expecting all same-sex
couples to plan for a break-up in such a way is not entirely
practical or realistic. Moreover, though possibly desirable from a
policy standpoint, forcing couples to plan for such potentially
unpleasant circumstances is not desirable from a personal
standpoint.
As noted above, a number of states have followed the
approach taken by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in H.S.H.-K.133
their families,” and unfair treatment in schools and neighborhoods because of
their familial status).
129. See id. at 6 (noting the disparities facing LGBT families in overall
health, access to health insurance, health coverage, and denial of hospital
visitation).
130. See id. at 5 (laying out the various inequities in tax burdens placed on
LGBT families including denial of dependency exemptions, child credits,
earned income credits, education deductions, and gift and estate exemptions).
An LGBT family of four making $45,000 per year pays an average of $2,200
more in taxes annually than a family of four headed by a heterosexual couple.
Id.
131. See Kira Horstmeyer, Note, Putting Your Eggs in Someone Else’s
Basket: Inserting Uniformity into the Uniform Parentage Act’s Treatment of
Assisted Reproduction, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 671, 700 (2007) (stating that
“consistency across the country in this area of family law is a desirable
objective”).
132. Supra notes 100 and 104 and corresponding text.
133. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 424; see e.g., In re Parentage
of L.B., 122 P.3d at 176-77 (holding that a co-parent can petition for visitation
and custodial rights as a de facto parent by meeting four requirements almost
identical to those set out in H.S.H.-K.); Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 504 (holding
that where a biological or adoptive parent consented and represented that the
co-parent was an equal parent, the biological parent shared decision-making
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Though imperfect, such an approach is definitely a step in the
right direction. By focusing more on the relationship between the
non-biological parent and the child, this test-based approach
manages to recognize the importance and benefits of maintaining
the relationship that non-biological parent has fostered with his or
her child.
This approach also continues to protect the rights of the
biological parent. By conducting a close examination of the coparent’s involvement in the child’s life, the court may still
determine that the co-parent has not had sufficient involvement in
the child’s life, and therefore, refrain from recognizing the coparent’s rights. These tests provide a judicial determination of
whether the co-parent is, for all intents and purposes, the child’s
parent.134 Furthermore, even if the co-parent parent meets these
requirements, the court must still determine that joint custody is
in the best interests of the child. These tests shift the main focus of
the inquiry from the relationship of the partners, to the
relationship between the co-parent and the child.135 This shift in
focus is important because it is the only way to guarantee that the
child’s best interest is at the heart of the resolution to any custody

responsibilities with the co-parent, and the co-parent was committed to jointly
parenting the child, the co-parent has standing to seek visitation and custody
rights).
134. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 424. The test ensures this by
requiring that the biological parent consented to the establishment of a
parent-like relationship; that the non-legal parent and child lived together;
that the non-legal parent assumed responsibilities of parenthood; and that the
non-legal parent has held a parental role for a sufficient period of time. See
also, In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d at 312 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (noting that the
H.S.H.-K. test ensures that a non-legal parent cannot gain custody without
“first having a significant, parent-like relationship with that child that the
natural parent allowed and encouraged”); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at
177 (under an almost identical test, “recognition of a de facto parent is ‘limited
to those adults who have fully and completely undertaken a permanent,
unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in a child’s life’”). The
L.B. court also noted that some critics argue that this type of test is a “slippery
slope,” whereby any adult close to a child could petition for visitation and/or
custody rights. Id. The court refuted that argument, though, by stating that a
critical component of the test is that the biological or legal parent “‘consented
to and fostered’ the parent-child relationship.” Id. at 179.
135. In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d at 314 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (noting that
under the H.S.H.-K. test, “a natural parent’s decision to end her relationship
with a co-parent would not obviate the reality of a child’s relationship with a
co-parent”). The In re Mullen dispute arose when Mullen and Hobbs ended
their relationship and Mullen left with Lucy. Id. at 308 (majority opinion).
Under an H.S.H.-K.-type test, the co-parent’s relationship with the child
would be reviewed independent of the co-parent’s relationship with the
biological parent. Id. at 314 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
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dispute between former same-sex partners. 136
Still, this approach is not ideal, mainly because it relies
heavily on the discretion of an individual family court judge.
Fortunately, there is a solution to that problem. By building on the
progress that this approach has already made, state legislatures
can implement laws that will recognize, equally and consistently,
the rights of all parents. The best way to resolve these disputes
(and even avoid them altogether) is to reform the system and
implement uniform laws that consider whether an individual is in
fact a child’s parent, not merely a parent through biology or at law.
B. Need for Certain and Uniform Reform
This Comment has focused on advocating for recognition of
the rights of non-legal parents facing custody and visitation
disputes. One must remember, however, that this advocacy is also
on behalf of the children who are truly at the center of those
disputes. Children are much better off when they are able to
maintain stable and healthy relationships with the parents who
raised them,137 even if those parents no longer have a relationship
of their own. This is the most important justification for making
sure that non-legal parents, who have acted as parents for the
entirety of a child’s life, are recognized as such and given the
opportunity to maintain relationships with their children.
One effective solution would be for each of the fifty states to
legalize same-sex marriage.138 With marriage comes the
presumption at law that both partners are the equal parent of any
child that comes about as a result of that relationship.139 This
would solve the multitude of problems140 that arise when such a
presumption does not exist and an ex-partner is forced to convince
a judge that he or she is, in fact, the children’s parent.
Of course, even with this solution, a number of difficulties
arise. The first, and most glaring, is the relatively small number of
states that have approved same-sex marriage to date.141 Even in
136. See infra note 137 and corresponding text (explaining the importance
and benefits of maintaining a child-parent relationship even after the parentparent relationship has broken down).
137. See ALL CHILDREN MATTER, supra note 119, at 18 (asserting that
“[c]hildren need the security and emotional support of loving parents or
guardians who care for and nurture them,” and that maintaining stability in
those relationships is key to healthy development).
138. But see infra notes 141-45 (noting the impracticalities of this solution).
139. LGBT FACTS AT A GLANCE, supra note 119, at 3.
140. See ALL CHILDREN MATTER, supra note 119, at 98 (detailing the issues
facing lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender couples and their children and
explaining that legalizing same-sex marriage could solve these issues).
141. See supra note 118 (noting that only ten jurisdictions recognize samesex marriages).

Do Not Delete

2013]

12/18/2013 12:55 PM

Parent in Life, Stranger at Law

891

light of indications that acceptance of same-sex marriage is
growing,142 there is still a long way to go.143 While this solution
may be the most comprehensive way to protect children and their
non-biological parents, its future is uncertain to say the least.144
Moreover, aside from the unclear prospects of nationwide approval
of same-sex marriage, this solution is also inadequate for those
same-sex couples who have no desire to marry, but wish to parent
children together.145
For those reasons, the more practical solution is to implement
(and amend those already existing) laws that act as a combination

142. In November 2012, voters in Maine, Maryland, and Washington
approved some form of same-sex marriage. Same-Sex Marriage and Domestic
Partnerships on the Ballot, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/same-sex-marriage-on-theballot.aspx (last updated Nov. 7, 2012). Additionally, voters in Minnesota
rejected a proposed constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage. Id.
Moreover, according to the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, forty-eight
percent of Americans approved of same-sex marriage in 2012, compared with
thirty-five percent in 2001. Id.
143. See id. (noting that in May 2012, North Carolina voters approved a
same-sex marriage ban); see also supra note 118 (stating that only ten
jurisdictions allow same-sex marriage).
144. On December 7, 2012, the Supreme Court granted petitions for writs of
certiorari in two cases involving issues of same-sex marriage. United States v.
Windsor, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 184 L. Ed. 2d 527 (U.S.
Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-307); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 184 L. Ed. 2d 526 (U.S. Dec. 7,
2012) (No.12-144). The main question in Windsor is whether the Defense of
Marriage Act’s definition of marriage as being between one man and one
woman violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the
laws as applied to same-sex couples married under the laws of their state.
United States v. Windsor, SCOTUS BLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/windsor-v-united-states-2/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2013). The issue in
Perry is “[w]hether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the State of California from defining marriage as the union of a man
and
woman.”
Hollingsworth
v.
Perry,
SCOTUS
BLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/hollingsworth-v-perry/ (last visited
Mar. 20, 2013). It remains unclear what, if any, impact these cases will have
on same-sex marriage rights throughout the country. See Lyle Denniston, On
Same-Sex Marriage, Options Open, SCOTUS BLOG (Dec. 7, 2012, 5:47 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=15 6291 (explaining that both cases present
preliminary questions that may prevent the Court from reaching the
Constitutional issues and noting that even if the Court does reach those
issues, the potential outcomes vary in kind and in scope).
145.
See Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender & Queer (LGBTQ),
UNMARRIED EQUALITY, http://www.unmarried.org/glbt.html (last visited Mar.
20, 2011) (noting that “significant numbers of LGBTQ people say they
wouldn’t want to marry even if same-sex marriage were legal”).
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of “consent to inseminate” laws146 and laws which create a
parentage presumption in both partners of a couple parenting a
child. By creating a presumption of parentage at the time the child
is born, a same-sex couple will not have to consider and plan for
the possibility that something may end their relationship, which
could, in turn, end the non-biological parent’s relationship with
her child.
This model law would achieve a number of things. First, and
most importantly, it would allow for the name of the biological
parent’s partner to appear on the child’s birth certificate as a
parent. This would indicate the intent147 and consent148 of both
partners to enter into a parent-child relationship with the child. It
would also eliminate the need to have a judge determine whether
one or both of the parents intended to enter into such a
relationship. The presence of both names on the birth certificate
would eliminate the questions of whether the non-biological parent
intended to become a parent, and whether the biological parent
consented to his or her partner becoming the parent of the child.
The model law would then state that, where there is intent to
enter into a parent-child relationship, a presumption of parentage
arises, regardless of the parents’ genders. This would eliminate
the need of the non-biological parent to resort to other means to
demonstrate to a trial court that he or she was the child’s actual
parent. It would also eliminate the ability of the biological parent
to challenge that assertion. Once the non-biological parent
establishes the intent element (which he or she could accomplish
by signing the birth certificate), the law would assume that both
parents are on equal footing and share the same rights. From that
point, a family court would make visitation and custody
determinations based on the best interest of the child.149 Such a
law not only appeals to fairness and common sense; it also protects
non-biological parents while simultaneously ensuring that child’s
best interest remains central.

146. ALL CHILDREN MATTER, supra note 119 at 36. “Consent-to-inseminate”
laws are those which “define when and how to grant parentage to the partner
(or spouse) of a birth mother using donor insemination.” Id.
147. See In re Parentage of L.B. 122 P.3d at 170 (stating that “in the case of
artificial insemination, the intent of the parties is the principal inquiry in
determining legal parentage”).
148. See In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 435-36 (requiring
consent of the biological parent before a non-legal parent’s rights are
recognized). See also ALL CHILDREN MATTER, supra note 119, at 36 (indicating
that “consent-to-inseminate” laws have as their basis the “consent” element).
149. See Fiser & Garrett, supra note 1, at *15 n.79 (noting that courts in all
fifty states apply some form of the “best interest of the child” standard when
adjudicating custody and visitation disputes).

Do Not Delete

2013]

12/18/2013 12:55 PM

Parent in Life, Stranger at Law

893

V. CONCLUSION
The law regarding the parentage rights of non-biological
parents who are or were in same-sex relationships with the
biological parent is in a state of flux and severe inconsistency.
Mullen is simply the latest high-profile case in a series of decisions
that, when coupled with various statutes, show the lack of
common sense and fairness these parents face across the country.
Courts and legislatures have started to look for solutions to this
problem, but there is still room for improvement. If the law allows
the non-biological parent’s name to appear on the birth certificate,
same-sex parents can easily and undeniably establish their intent
to raise a child together and as equal co-parents. For the coparents’ sake, and even more importantly, for the sake of the
children at the center of these disputes, state legislatures must act
to make this area of the law more equal and consistent.

